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INTRODUCTION

I
T
O
W
I

n Doha, Qatar the government of the United States conducted successive
rounds of negotiations with a non-State entity, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (more commonly known as the Taliban) over the future of a State
that was not present—the government of Afghanistan. The aim of these negotiations was to achieve an agreement enabling a great power to claim success and draw down forces, reminiscent of the 1988 Geneva talks by which
the forces of the Soviet Union withdrew from the country.
Taliban attacks continued and negotiations were suspended. At this writing, the status of the talks and U.S. force posture are unclear. Regardless, the
United States will retain a security interest in Afghanistan and the region.
Indeed, U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is inevitable, but there will be
choices about strategy. In 1952, the U.S. Naval War College convened a lecture series devoted to strategy. On March 20, the lecturer was Harold D.
Lasswell, an architect of the New Haven School of Jurisprudence.1 Lasswell
observed, “The aim of strategy is to maximize the realization of the goal
values of the body politic.”2 This article proposes that law is among the available strategic instruments to advance goal values common to the United
States, Afghanistan, and the world community.
II.

GENEVA TO DOHA

The Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland was built to serve as headquarters of the League of Nations. On April 14, 1988, it was the venue for negotiations leading to an agreement under which the Soviet Union would leave
Afghanistan after a ten-year war. These so-called “proximity talks” were facilitated by Diego Cordovez, a personal representative of the U.N. SecretaryGeneral, who acted as go-between in discussions conducted in Kabul and

1. For an overview of the New Haven School, see W. Michael Reisman, The View from
the New Haven School of International Law, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (1992). For a detailed explanation of the School, see HAROLD
D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1992).
2. Harold D. Lasswell, Political Factors in the Formulation of Strategy, 4 U.S. NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICERS 49, 63–64 (1952).
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Islamabad with the Soviet-backed regime.3 The Afghan resistance, known as
the mujahidin,4 was excluded from the negotiations.
The resulting accords consisted of four instruments. The first was a Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on
Non-Interference and Non-Intervention.5 Provisions of this treaty were designed to hamstring the mujahidin. For example, Article II(8), stated:
to prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other High Contracting Party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly to deny facilities, including financing for the training, equipping and
transit of such mercenaries.6

Likewise, Article II(11) disallowed “any assistance to or use of or tolerance
of terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other High
Contracting Party.”7 Finally, Article II(12) provided:
3. See Adam Roberts, Afghanistan and International Security, 85 INTERNATIONAL LAW
STUDIES 13, 84 (2009); SETH G. JONES, IN THE GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES, AMERICA’S WAR IN
AFGHANISTAN 36 (2009).
4. Mujahidin is the plural form of the word “mujahid,” which means “one who engages
in jihad.” Mujahidin, OXFORD ISLAMIC STUDIES ONLINE, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1593 (citing JOHN L. ESPOSITO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
ISLAM (2004)) (“The term became well known in the West in the early 1980s as the Afghan
mujahidin battled against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.”). It is important to note,
however, that jihad does not equate to armed struggle. As Esposito states, “Generally referring to an endeavor toward a praiseworthy aim, the term jihad has many meanings,” and that
while “often translated as ‘holy war’” in the West, armed struggle is only one of four types
of jihad. See Jihad, OXFORD ISLAMIC STUDIES ONLINE, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t243/e175 (citing 2 THE ISLAMIC WORLD: PAST AND PRESENT (John
L. Esposito ed., 2004)).
5. Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and
Non-Intervention, Afg.-Pak., Apr. 14, 1988; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated
Apr. 14, 1988 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, annex I at 3, U.N. Doc. S/19834 (Apr. 26, 1988) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General
Letter].
6. Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and
Non-Intervention, supra note 5, art. II(8).
7. Id. art. II(11).
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to prevent within its territory the presence, harboring, in camps and bases
or otherwise, organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming of individuals and political, ethnic and any other groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest in the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly also to prevent the use of mass media and
the transportation of arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals
and groups.8

The second instrument was a Declaration on International Guarantees.9
The parties were the Soviet Union and the United States. The signatories
undertook
to invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the
internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan and to respect the commitments contained in the bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention.10

The third instrument was a Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of
Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return
of Refugees.11 It provided that all Afghan refugees temporarily present in the
territory of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall be given the opportunity
to return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with the arrangements
and conditions set out in the present agreement.12 The fourth instrument was
an Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation
relating to Afghanistan.13 It was signed by the Kabul regime and the government of Pakistan, and in witness, the representatives of the States-Guarantors, the Soviet Union and United States. It provided:

8. Id. art. II(12).
9. Declaration on International Guarantees, U.S.S.R.-U.S., Apr. 14, 1988; see U.N. Secretary-General Letter, supra note 5, annex I, at 6.
10. U.N. Secretary-General Letter, supra note 5, annex I, at 1.
11. Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees, Afg.-Pak., Apr. 14, 1988; see U.N. Secretary-General Letter, supra note 5, annex I, at 7.
12. U.N. Secretary-General Letter, supra note 5, annex I, at 7.
13. Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees, supra note 11, at 10.
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In accordance with the timeframe agreed upon between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Afghanistan there will be a
phased withdrawal of the foreign troops which will start on the date of
entry into force mentioned above. One half of the troops will be withdrawn
by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed
within nine months.14

In the fourth instrument, the U.S. Secretary of State transmitted to the
U.N. Secretary-General the following statement:
The obligations undertaken by the guarantors are symmetrical. In this regard, the United States has advised the Soviet Union that the U.S. retains
the right, consistent with its obligations as guarantor, to provide military
assistance to parties in Afghanistan. Should the Soviet Union exercise restraint in providing military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the U.S.
similarly will exercise restraint.15

This last instrument was an escape clause. For the Soviet Union, the Geneva Accords were a convenient myth, a mask for an “honorable” disengagement.16 The Accords also signaled continued support to clients within
Afghanistan as long they acted in the interest of the Great Powers. Critically,
they did not address internal political arrangements. No strategy was in place,
nor apparently, was any contemplated. The consequence was a power vacuum that internal armed groups and external regional powers would enter.
Several years of civil war ensued, paving the way for the Taliban.17
More than thirty years after the Geneva Accords, U.S. representatives
were in Doha negotiating an end to another Afghan war.18 According to the

14. Declaration on International Guarantees (Afghanistan Settlement) U.S. Statement,
art. (2).
15. G.R. BERRIDGE, RETURN TO THE UN: UN DIPLOMACY IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS
154 (1991).
16. “Little at Geneva was devoted to finding transitional political arrangements that
would reduce subsequent risks of deadly civil strife throughout Afghanistan without impairing the unfolding of self-determination.” Richard Falk, The Afghan Settlement and the Future of
World Politics, in THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN 142, 157 (Amin Saikal &
William Maley eds., 1989).
17. Olivier Roy presciently wrote, “the seed for a civil war among the mujaheddin have
been sown. Olivier Roy, From Victory to Defeat in Afghanistan, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 7,
1989.
18. According to longstanding Afghan analyst and journalist Peter Jouvenal,
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U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Dr. Zalmay Khalizad, “We would like to leave a very positive legacy here . . . we are not
cutting and running. We are not looking for a withdrawal agreement. We are
looking for a peace agreement. And we’re looking for a long-term relationship and partnership with Afghanistan.”19 The talks were a vehicle to reduce
the U.S. military presence. Meanwhile Afghans worried that compassion fatigue has set in and that the West has an exit strategy.20 Their collective
memory is a longue durée.
III.

A LONGUE DURÉE

The French historian Fernand Braudel coined the term longue durée, defining
it as “the history of long, even very long, duration in contrast with episodic
time.”21 The longue durée resides in the Afghan collective memory as perceptions and interpretations of events that are passed down and remembered.22
This collective mindset is the setting (the deep context) for strategy, development, and constitutive processes in Afghanistan.23

The Qatar talks are a mirage. No one represents the Taliban. They are as divided as every
other Afghan group. The Qatar element is even more disconnected to the Afghan population, as they have been out of Afghanistan for over 15 years, and no longer have the confidence of the Afghans.

Interview with Peter Jouvenal (June 12, 2019).
19. Envoy: U.S. Not ‘Cutting and Running’ from Afghanistan, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO
LIBERTY (July 12, 2019), https://www.rferl.org/a/envoy-us-not-cutting-and-runningfrom-afghanistan/30051289.html.
20. Afghans have previously been here. See, e.g., Charles H. Norchi, Opinion, A New
Start in Afghanistan, NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 13, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/
10/13/opinion/a-new-start-in-afghanistan.html (arguing that an Afghan election must not
be an exit strategy).
21. FERNAND BRAUDEL, ON HISTORY 25 (Sarah Matthews trans., 1980).
22. Collective memory is “the living bond of generations,” a depository of traditions.
It is an accumulation of national experiences and events, as well as society’s efforts to revise
and redefine those events and experiences. Individuals living within a particular culture have
fixed in their memories, facts and particular attitudes and ways of thinking derived from the
past. Personal “remembrances will simply be a reconstruction of the past, achieved with
data borrowed from the present.” MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY 69
(Lewis A. Coser trans. & ed., University of Chicago Press, 1992).
23. Louis Dupree explains that episodes across events of long duration from pre-historic times to the current era are key to understanding Afghans. LOUIS DUPREE, AFGHANISTAN (1980).
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The arrival of Alexander the Great set the pattern.24 In Afghanistan, invading armies tended to stay awhile, destroy, and leave a mark that would
endure until the next invader. Alexander liberated Greek colonists from Persian rule and fought the Bactrians of Afghanistan in 326–23 BCE.25 As one
historian notes, “Alexander faced the same dilemma as modern tacticians
whose high-tech hammers have so often pummeled fruitlessly, as was the
case throughout the Soviet invasion, where ‘fighting Afghans was like nailing
jelly to a wall; in the end there was just a wall full of bent nails.’”26 By the
time Alexander reached India, Afghanistan had legal codes and prescriptions
that were applied by his designated satraps (governor or local leader).27 At the
time of Alexander’s death, the Hindu Kush Mountains separated two Greek
kingdoms, the Bactrian to its north and the Indo-Greek to its south.28
From 269–32 BCE, the Mauryan Emperor Ashoka reigned and brought
Buddhism with its associated norms to Afghanistan.29 By the first century
CE, the Kushans exerted control from the Central Asian steppes south into
India and west to the Persian plateau. Gandahara, near present day Kabul,
became the seat of government and a center of literary and artistic creativity.30 During the second Kushan dynasty, the giant Buddhas of Bamiyan were
built.31 By the twelfth century CE, Turkish dynasties controlled Afghanistan,
24. See FRANK L. HOLT, INTO THE LAND OF BONES, ALEXANDER THE GREAT IN AFGHANISTAN (2005); GUY MACLEAN ROGERS, ALEXANDER: THE AMBIGUITY OF GREATNESS (2004).
25. “Greek colonists in Asia did not wish to be liberated and resisted [Alexander]
fiercely.” DUPREE, supra note 23, at 274.
26. HOLT, supra note 24 at 67.
27. As Jawaharlal Nehru wrote, “Alexander entered India through the Khyber Pass in
the northwest and via Taxila, which lies a little north of Rawalpindi. Even now you can see
the ruins of this ancient city.” JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, GLIMPSES OF WORLD HISTORY 48
(1942).
28. DUPREE, supra note 23, at 285. Following a mutiny of his troops, Alexander then
turned his army toward Babylon where he died. See W. W. TARN, THE GREEKS IN BACTRIA
AND INDIA (1951).
29. VINCENT A. SMITH, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF INDIA 117–42 (1958); DUPREE, supra, note 23, at 285.
30. WILLIAM MCGOVERN, THE EARLY EMPIRES OF CENTRAL ASIA 251 (1939).
31. See NANCY HATCH DUPREE, AN HISTORICAL GUIDE TO AFGHANISTAN 154 (1970)
The Colossal Buddhas of Bamiyan must be set against the back drop of the fabulous era
which created them. Rome, rich and expanding lay to the west. China, ruled with brilliance
by the Han Dynasty, lay to the east. India, source of the jewels and spices coveted by all, lay
to the south. The Silk Route connected these diverse capitals of luxury and, mid-way, the
Kushan King Kanishka gained wealth and power; and the Afghan area prospered. Luxury
laden caravans plodded back and forth along the northern plains to the great transshipment
depots of Balkh and Tashkurghan, where some turned south to cross the Hindu Kush. Half
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Persia (present day Iran), and north India (present day Pakistan).32 Then
Genghis Khan swept across the Central Asian steppes destroying the civilizations of the thirteenth century and scattering the Turks. Great Afghan cities such as Balkh, Herat, Ghazni, and Bamiyan were destroyed entirely.
Next came the Moghuls who ruled until 1707.33 They gave way to invading Uzbeks and ultimately Pashtuns who by 1648 held large areas of southern
Afghanistan.34 Two major Pashtun tribes became intense rivals: the Abdalis
(who later became Durranis) and the Gilzais. Nadir Shah, a Turkman with a
large Persian army, exerted control over Afghan cities.35 In 1736, he took
Kandahar allowing the Abdalis to resettle there and exiled the Gilzais to
Khurasan, thus determining the current settlements of Pashtun tribes in
southcentral and western Afghanistan.36 He attacked the Moghul Court in
Delhi and carried the Peacock Throne of Shah Jahan and the crown Moghul
jewels, including the Koh-i-Nur diamond, back to Afghanistan.37
Afghanistan became de facto Pashtun and customary Pushtunwali law
governed. The centers of power were the Abdali tribe of Kandahar and the
Gilzai of Herat.38 But there was no leader until a jirga39 chose Ahmad Shah
Durrani.40 The Durrani empire endured from 1747 to 1793 and stretched
from Central Asia south to Delhi and from the Arabian Sea to Kashmir.41
In 1770, the Amir of Bokhara, Murad Beg, presented Ahmad Shah Durrani with a kherqa or a cloak worn by the Prophet Mohammad.42 Durrani had
a mosque constructed in Kandahar to protect the kherqa. By 1772, Durrani
way through this arduous mountain trek they stopped to rest in the valley of Bamiyan where
a busy, bustling caravanserai stood at the entrance of the Foladi Valley.

32. See DUPREE, supra note 23, at 312–41.
33. SMITH, supra note 29, at 320–62.
34. DUPREE, supra note 23, at 319.
35. Id. at 330.
36. Id.
37. The Koh-i-Nur diamond was later carried off to the Punjab in India and then to
Britain where it is among the Crown Jewels. See id. at 331.
38. See AMIN SAIKAL, MODERN AFGHANISTAN: A HISTORY OF STRUGGLE AND SURVIVAL 18 (2012) (noting the phrase “from tribal confederacy to national coalescence”).
39. A Jirga is a longstanding instrument of Afghan governance. Jirga are authoritative
and prescriptions typically backed by effective power and are, hence, law.
40. See GUL GHUBAR, AHMAD SHAH BABA-YI-AFGHAN (1943).
41. GEORGE MACMUNN, AFGHANISTAN FROM DARIUES TO AMANULLAH 52–59
(1929).
42. DUPREE, supra note 23, at 339. Eventually the cloak would play a critical role in the
rise of Mullah Omar as “commander of the faithful” and Taliban leader. See AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN SOUTH ASIA 42 (20002).
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was suffering from face cancer that forced him to wear an artificial silver
nose.43 He died the same year,44 and soon thereafter, the Russians and the
British moved on Afghanistan in a pattern that would continue into the
twenty-first century: external players sought a buffer to maximize power and
protect territory.
By the eighteenth century, much of the world was comprised of States,
while Afghanistan was a loose network of autonomous tribes under the rule
of emirs. The “land of the Afghan” was a territory in which various actors
employed violence in the pursuit of power. As the armies of the Czar moved
south, London concluded that the Russian advance could only be thwarted
by “forward policies,” which meant getting there first, using common interests to build tribal alliances, and creating a territorial buffer.45 This phase of
history became known as the “Great Game,” a phrase coined by Captain
Arthur Conolly before he was executed by Bokharan tribesmen in 184246 and
immortalized by Rudyard Kipling in his poem Kim.47
Early Great Game intrigues involved England and France.48 But, by the
early 1800s, the Russians were at the gates of Herat. The empire of the Czar
was expanding.49 This alarmed the British who viewed Herat, the provincial
43. G. SINGH, AHMAD SHAH DURRANI: FATHER OF MODERN AFGHANISTAN 326
(1959).
44. Id.
45. Within his memoir, in a chapter entitled “Kabul Intrigues,” Bruce wrote:
The arrangements we had concluded with the Waziris (an Afghan tribe) for the opening up
and pacification of the country continued to progress satisfactorily . . . and should another
frontier war with Afghanistan or Russia arise, it is then that the value of the position for
dealing with these tribes will be fully realized and appreciated.

RICHARD ISSAQ BRUCE, THE FORWARD POLICY 285 (1900).
46. PETER HOPKIRK, THE GREAT GAME: THE STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE IN CENTRAL
ASIA 1 (1992).
47. “Now I shall go far and far into the North, playing the Great Game.” RUDYARD
KIPLING, KIM 203 (1901). But see B.D. HOPKINS, THE MAKING OF MODERN AFGHANISTAN 34 (2012), for an account of the Great Game as a myth.
48. “In the year 1808 when . . . it appeared as if the French were to carry the war into
Asia, it was thought expedient by the British government in India to send a mission to the
King of Cabaul.” 1 MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE, ACCOUNT OF THE KINGDOM OF CAUBUL, AND ITS DEPENDENCIES, IN PERSIA, TARTARY, AND INDIA 1 (London, Richard Bentley 1842). French agents were active throughout Persia and were attempting to make inroads
in Kabul. Napoleon was seeking an alliance between France, Persia, and Afghanistan. But
by comparison with Russia, the French threat was exaggerated. See HOPKIRK, supra note 46;
see also PATRICK MACRORY, KABUL CATASTROPHE: THE RETREAT OF 1842 (1986).
49. See, e.g., KARL E. MEYER & SHAREEN BLAIR BRYCE, TOURNAMENT OF SHADOWS
(1999).
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capital of Western Afghanistan on Persia’s westernmost edge, as the gateway
to India. Mohammed, Shah of Persia, laid siege to the city with Russian support. Russia now cast a shadow over Central Asia and loomed over British
interests in India. 50
The 1838 “Simla Manifesto” signaled British intentions toward Afghanistan: invade the territory and restore Soojah as Shah.51 Further, GovernorGeneral Macnaghten published a codicil stating, “we will continue to prosecute with vigour the measures which have been announced, with a view to
the substitution of a friendly for a hostile power in the eastern provinces of
Afghanistan and to the establishment of a permanent barrier against schemes
of aggression upon our north-west frontier.”52 This would entail amassing
an “Army of the Indus” comprising British Company, Sikh, and Bengal
troops, but the key measure signaled in the Manifesto was to place the unpopular Soojah on the throne.53
Britain was a “great civilizing power”54 and by civilizing Afghan tribes
and identifying their interests with those of England, India could be de50. “Herat is called the gate of India because through it, and through it alone, the valleys
can be entered which lead to the only vulnerable parts of India.” CHARLES MARVIN, THE
RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT 100 (London & New York, Frederick Warne & Co.
1885).
51. TAMIN ANSARY, GAMES WITHOUT RULES: THE OFTEN INTERRUPTED HISTORY
OF AFGHANISTAN 45 (2012). Soojah was also referred to as Emir Shuja. See DUPREE, supra
note 23, at 376.
52. MACRORY, supra note 48, at 81.
53. On October 1, 1838, a “Declaration on the Part of the Right Honourable Governor-General of India,” also known as the “Simla Manifesto” was published. It was written
by Governor-General Macnaghten and read in part,
His Majesty Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk will enter Afghanistan surrounded by his own troops,
and will be supported against foreign interference and fractious opposition by a British army
. . . and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of
Afghanistan established, the British army will withdraw.

Id. at 80; see also ABDUL HAKIM TABIBI, AFGHANISTAN: A NATION IN LOVE WITH FREEDOM
114–18 (1985); HENRY MARION DURAND, THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR AND ITS CAUSES 66–
82 (London, Longmans, Green & Co. 1879).
54. Lord Roberts observed in an influential speech to the House of Lords in 1898:
I can only venture to express my firm conviction that, whatever may be the cost of the
measures I propose, the cost, to say nothing of the danger to the Empire, will be definitely
greater if we allow matters to drift until we are obliged, in order to resist aggression in
Afghanistan, to hurriedly mobilize a sufficient force to subdue the hostile tribes through
whose country we should have to pass before we could reach those strategical positions
which it is essential we should be able to occupy without delay if we do not intend India—
that brightest jewel in Great Britain’s Crown—to pass out of our safe keeping.
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fended against Russia. Hence, the forward policy was “the policy of endeavoring to extend our influence over, and establish law and order on that part
of the Border where anarchy, murder, and robbery up to the present time
have reigned supreme.”55 A chronicler of the period noted,
an active forward policy . . . involved two suppositions, and also a deepseated economic problem. Those points were the certitude that Shah Shujah was sufficiently acceptable to the Afghan people for his restoration to
produce the effect desired . . . . The economic problem was this: Were the
resources of the army in India in stores and transport sufficient? Could the
army be maintained so far from its bases . . . Was it adequate for the entirely
novel and distant undertaking?56

The policy, as applied, was deeply flawed.
Mohammad Akbar Khan, the son of Ahmad Shah who earlier had been
deposed by the British, pretended to quell a growing insurrection. Previously,
he watched Sir William Macnaghten be hacked to death.57 As the population
became intensely hostile to the British presence, a withdrawal was planned.
Four-thousand British troops and 12,000 followers, wives, and children departed Kabul after Christmas in 1841.58 The column was relentlessly attacked
while retreating. At the fortress of Jalalabad near India, rather than the retreating Army of the Indus, the British garrison saw a lone horseman riding
up the Kabul-Jalalabad Road. The date was January 13, 1842, the last remnant of an army, Surgeon Brydon, had arrived in Jalalabad.59Afghan tribesmen had briefly slowed the expansion of British power.60
A culture of political violence continued. On February 20, 1919, Afghanistan’s Amir Habibullah was assassinated and succeeded by his youngest son,
See BRUCE, supra note 45, at 327 (citing Robert G. Sandeman, Speech in the House of Lords,
Mar. 7, 1898).
55. Id. at 325.
56. MACMUNN, supra note 41, at 110.
57. HOPKIRK, supra note 46, at 256.
58. LADY SALE, A JOURNAL OF THE DISASTERS IN AFGHANISTAN, 1841–2, at 221–78
(New York, Harper & Brothers 1843).
59. The dramatic incident inspired these lines by Rudyard Kipling:
When you’re wounded and left on Afghanistan’s plains,
And the women come out to cut up what remains,
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains,
An’ go to your Gawd like a soldier.

RUDYARD KIPLING, THE YOUNG BRITISH SOLDIER 56 (1892).
60. See J.P. FERRIER, HISTORY OF THE AFGHANS (London, John Murray 1858).
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Amanullah, who proclaimed the independence of Afghanistan.61 Afghan
forces in the Khyber Pass were repulsed by the British and a peace treaty was
concluded at Rawalpindi in August 1919.62 The treaty recognized the Durand
Line Agreement separating Afghanistan and India (later Pakistan).63 But
much of India’s North West Frontier, including the city of Peshawar and the
tribal agencies, was traditional Pashtun territory. Tribes on each side of the
Durand Line shared a common ethnic identity and looked to Peshawar as
their capital. At the time of Indo-Pakistani partition, Kabul demanded the
Pashtun areas be given independence rather than a choice between India and
Pakistan.64 What became known as the Pashtunistan issue has never been
fully resolved.65 Indeed, even today, the plaza in front of the presidential
palace in Kabul retains the name Pashtunistan Square.
Amanullah undertook extensive modernization programs, improving the
judiciary and government administration. The first constitution of Afghanistan was promulgated in 1923.66 A system of courts was established and secular law codes were drafted. Following a visit to Europe, Amanullah announced reforms directed against traditional social customs, including the
wearing of the veil. In the autumn of 1928, tribal uprisings began in eastern
Afghanistan. Kabul was occupied in January 1929, by a brigand who proclaimed himself Habibullah II.67 After unsuccessful efforts to reclaim power,
Amanullah fled to India and then Europe.68
Amanullah was replaced by Nadir Shah who was assassinated in 1933
and succeeded by his only son, Zahir Shah.69 Good relations were established
with Britain and the Soviet Union, as well as with predominantly Muslim
countries, especially Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Attempts to form close links
with the United States generated little success but important connections
61. DUPREE, supra note 23, at 441.
62. THOMAS BARFIELD, AFGHANISTAN: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY 181
(2010).
63. DUPREE, supra note 23, at 443.
64. JEFFERY J. ROBERTS, THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN 123 (2003).
65. See Charles H. Norchi, Culture and Law on the Durand Line: Continuity and Change, in
WILLIAM ASCHER & JAY HEFFRON, CULTURAL CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE: NEW PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT 203 (2010); see also AZMAT HAYAT KHAN, THE DURAND
LINE: ITS GEO-STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE (2000); HASSAN KAKAR, A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN 1863–1901 (2006).
66. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, LAW IN AFGHANISTAN 20 (1985).
67. ABDUL SAMAD GHAUS, THE FALL OF AFGHANISTAN 46 (1988).
68. See generally SMITH, supra note 29.
69. DUPREE, supra note 23, at 477.
373

International Law Studies

2019

were made with Germany. During the Second World War, Afghanistan remained neutral.70
In 1947, British rule ended in India. Afghanistan’s role as a balance
among powers continued although the country increasingly leaned towards
the Soviet Union. In turn, the Soviet Union supported Afghanistan’s position on the question of the tribal lands in the North West Frontier Province
(NWFP) of the new Pakistan State. Kabul contended that Pashtun tribesmen
should be given the choice of joining Pakistan or forming an independent
Pashtunistan.71 This led to strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan and hindered Afghanistan’s transit trade through Pakistan.
In September 1953, Prime Minister Shah Mahmud was replaced by Sardar Muhammed Daud Khan.72 His regime pressed for large-scale State-directed economic development.73 In December 1955, Soviet leaders Nikolay
Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev visited Kabul and declared support for Afghanistan’s position on Pashtunistan.74 The Soviet Union provided largescale economic aid and the United States provided some aid as well.75 Daud
obtained military assistance, arms, and training facilities from the Soviet Union and greatly strengthened the army. He also introduced reforms to improve the status of women, and in 1959, reformists launched a campaign
protesting the wearing of the veil, generating considerable opposition from
tribal and conservative religious leaders.76
Daud pressed more strongly for Pashtunistan. He denounced the 1921
Anglo-Afghan treaty that had endorsed the Durand Line and summoned a
Loya Jirga to declare support of Pashtunistan.77 Afghan-Pakistan relations de-

70. HENRY S. BRADSHER, AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET UNION 16 (1983).
71. Largely owing to the Pashtunistan issue, Afghanistan voted against the admission
of Pakistan to the United Nations. See ROBERT D. CREWS, AFGHAN MODERN: THE HISTORY OF A GLOBAL NATION 129 (2015).
72. OLIVIER ROY, ISLAM AND RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN 74 (1986).
73. DUPREE, supra note 23, at 507 (noting that economists and policymakers often referred to these practices as étatism during this era).
74. EDWARD GIRARDET, AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET WAR 221 (1985).
75. A well-placed U.S. diplomat and scholar wrote of this period, “very modest American aid and generous understanding could have established an Afghanistan future inextricably linked to the West.” Leon B. Poullada, Afghanistan and the United States: The Crucial Years,
35 MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 178, 182 (1981).
76. DUPREE, supra note 23, at 499.
77. Id.
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teriorated and Afghan troops entered Pakistan tribal territory. In 1961, diplomatic relations were broken with Pakistan and the border sealed.78 Afghanistan was obliged to make arrangements with the Soviet Union for transit
facilities for exports. When Daud abruptly resigned, King Zahir Shah appointed Dr. Mohammad Yousuff as Prime Minister.79 On March 28, 1963,
the King appointed a committee to draft a new constitution, which was presented to a Loya Jirga in September 1964, proclaiming, “Afghanistan is a constitutional monarchy, an independent, unitary and indivisible state.”80 The
Constitution prescribed that the State would conduct its religious rituals according to the Islamic Hanafi School and that freedom of worship would be
guaranteed to non-Muslims.81 The Loya Jirga approved the Constitution and
a period of stability followed, to which many Afghans in later years would
look to with nostalgia.82
In 1973, King Zahir Shah was deposed, a republic declared, and Sardar
Muhammed Daud Khan returned to Afghanistan as Prime Minister.83
Daud’s main objective was rapid economic development. He increased taxes
and sought foreign aid from Western States, Eastern bloc States, Iran, and
the Arab Gulf States. Daud tightened State control over the economy, nationalized the principal private bank, the Banke Milli Afghan, and instituted
land reform.84
In 1975, the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression
was renewed.85 During the latter part of 1977 and in 1978 Daud increased
his attacks on domestic political opponents of the right and left. 86 On April

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. ASSASI QANUN [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 1, 1964, art. 1 (Afg.) [hereinafter AFGHANISTAN CONSTITUTION] (“Sovereignty in Afghanistan belongs to the nation. The Afghan nation is composed of all those individuals who possess the citizenship of the State of Afghanistan in accordance with the provisions of the law. The word Afghan shall apply to each
such individual.”).
81. DUPREE, supra note 23, at 559.
82. The 1964 Constitution served as the interim constitution of the transitional government under the terms of the December 2001 Bonn Agreement until the adoption of the
2004 Constitution. See BARNETT R. RUBIN, AFGHANISTAN FROM THE COLD WAR
THROUGH THE WAR ON TERROR 149 (2013).
83. DUPREE, supra note 23, at 753.
84. DAVID B. EDWARDS, BEFORE TALIBAN 62 (2006).
85. GHAUS, supra note 67, at 161.
86. As one account notes, Daud “was happiest when he could light his American cigarettes with Soviet matches.” See THEODORE ELIOT, CIA BIOGRAPHICAL REPORT: THE AF375
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27, the commander of military and air force units in the Kabul area staged a
coup that became known as the Great Saur Revolution.87 Daud, nearly all his
family, leading ministers, and principal military commanders were killed.88
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) leader Nur Muhammad Taraki became President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister.89
The 1977 Constitution was abolished, the Republic of Afghanistan was renamed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), power was vested
in a Revolutionary Council, and the PDPA became the only political party.
The PDPA introduced a five-year plan to reduce rural indebtedness, abolish
dowries, and redistribute land. The reforms pitted urban Kabul against rural
Afghanistan and new civil law codes against revered customary legal practices. A tribal revolt began in the eastern province of Nuristan and armed
insurrection spread.
The regime grew dependent on Soviet aid. The Afghan national flag was
changed from black, red, and Islamic green to an all-red design similar to the
flags of the Soviet Republics throughout Central Asia. During the winter of
1978, guerrilla warfare erupted sporadically in the countryside. The army was
beset by defections. Soviet military advisors and civilians became integral to
the functioning of ministries. A resistance emerged and soon established political organizations across the Khyber Pass in Peshawar, Pakistan.
In February 1979, U.S. Ambassador Adolph “Spike” Dubs was killed in
a kidnapping incident when Afghan police coached by Soviet advisors assaulted the hotel where he was held.90 The event further alienated Washington from the Taraki regime. The Carter administration cut aid programs and
withdrew most U.S. personnel.91 By mid-year the regime’s behavior and the
country’s chaos ended all foreign aid outside of Communist countries.

LEADERSHIP 22 (1975); see also Nushin Arbabzadah, Opinion, Remembering Afghanistan’s First President, GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/mar/21/afghanistan.
87. BRADSHER, supra note 70, at 74.
88. ABDUL SHAMS, IN COLD BLOOD: THE COMMUNIST CONQUEST OF AFGHANISTAN
22 (1987).
89. BARNET RUBIN, THE FRAGMENTATION OF AFGHANISTAN 111 (1995); See also, PETER TOMSEN, THE WARS OF AFGHANISTAN (2013).
90. See Robert Trumbull, U.S. Asserts Afghans Ignored Pleas Not to Attack Abductors of Envoy, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 15, 1979, at A1.
91. NANCY NEWELL & RICHARD NEWELL, THE STRUGGLE FOR AFGHANISTAN 105
(1981)
GHAN
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Taraki met with Brezhnev in Moscow and agreed that Amin must be
removed in a coup. However, a forewarned Amin turned the tables and Taraki was killed instead.92 Now even more strongly in control, Amin urged
President Zia of Pakistan to seal the border and restrict guerrilla operations.
However, Amin failed to win over the rebels or to suppress them. And, as
the flight of refugees from Afghanistan continued,93 new guerrilla groups
formed among the refugees in Pakistan. Apart from a common devotion to
Islam, there was little unity.94 The Amin regime was supported by 80,000
Soviet troops and 1,500 Soviet civilians.95
In December, Moscow engineered another coup, airlifting thousands of
troops into Afghanistan. They utilized a network of transportation and communications that Moscow had put in place during the last two decades. In
mid-month, Amin narrowly escaped assassination. On December 25, Soviet
troop movements became a major airlift transporting 5,000 soldiers into Kabul.96 Two days later, having secured the city, Soviet forces attacked the
stronghold to which Amin had retreated.97 By day’s end, fighting ceased and
Radio Kabul broadcast an announcement by Afghan Soviet puppet Babrak
Karmal proclaiming an end to the Amin regime and appealing for Soviet
aid.98 Amin was summarily executed.99
Four Soviet divisions crossed the Amu Darya River to begin garrisoning
the major Afghan towns.100 On April 21, a constitution was adopted by the
Revolutionary Council outlining basic rights, the organs of government, and
their competences.101 In May, Radio Kabul announced that anti-government

92. Id.
93. The number of refugees in Pakistan rose from 192,000 in September 1979 to
400,000 in December. A substantial number also fled to Iran. See, e.g., Afghanistan: The Unending Crisis, REFUGEES MAGAZINE, June 1, 1997.
94. Several short-lived alliances were announced. These included the Islamic Alliance
for the Liberation of Afghanistan, formed among refugees in Pakistan, and the Islamic Revolution Liberation Front of Afghanistan, established in Iran. However, the bulk of rebel
military activity came from local groups within Afghanistan.
95. In November 1979, the DRA and the Soviet Union concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Co-Operation. Meanwhile a fundamentalist revolution was sweeping Iran.
96. BRADSHER supra 70, at 169.
97. Id.
98. Id at 170
99. SHAMS, supra note 88, at 32.
100. Id at 23.
101. BRADSHER supra 70, at 89.
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demonstrators arrested earlier that month would be tried by the Afghan Revolutionary Courts. Afghans were again subjected to the policies and strategies of outsiders. They became victims of the Brezhnev Doctrine:
When external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of restoration of the
capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in any country—a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole—
this is no longer merely a problem for that country’s people, but a common
problem, the concern of all socialist countries.102

Within a month, Red Army forces rose to 85,000, and shortly thereafter to
105,000.103 The strategy was initially aimed at securing main cities, strategic
points, and roads. The Soviet presence emboldened the resistance who called
themselves mujahidin or holy warriors. Mujahidin forces ambushed Soviet
convoys and government bases before receding into the Afghan hills. The
Red Army responded. Crops were burned, trails blanketed with anti-personnel mines, entire villages razed, and non-combatants killed.104
Through displacement and flight, close to one-half of the Afghan population became refugees. Bombings, torture, executions, and forced displacement rendered the human rights picture increasingly grim. In turn, the mujahidin resistance grew. By mid-1980, the resistance controlled nearly eighty
percent of the countryside while the Karmal Regime held the cities.105

102. Harry Schwartz, The Khrushchev/Brezhnev Doctrine at Helsinki, NEW YORK TIMES,
Aug. 5, 1975, https://www.nytimes.com/1975/08/05/archives/the-khrushchevbrezhnevdoctrine-at-helsinki.html. In addition, it is evident there was concern in the Kremlin over
the possible disintegration of the Afghan State. As one official remarked, “To leave the
Afghan revolution without internationalist help and support would mean to condemn it to
inevitable destruction and to permit an access to hostile imperialist forces to the Soviet
border.” See J. BRUCE AMSTUTZ, AFGHANISTAN: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF SOVIET OCCUPATION 41 (1986).
103. See AMSTUTZ, supra note 102, at 155.
104. See Rep. of the Econ. & Soc. Council, Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan:
Note by the Secretary-General, Annex, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, Prepared by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights in
Accordance with Commission Resolution 1987/58 and Economic and Social Council Decision 1987/51, U.N. Doc. A/42/667, annex (Oct. 23, 1987) [hereinafter Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan].
105. BRADSHER supra 70, at 90.
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Although poorly developed and articulated, the doctrine of the Afghan resistance movement hewed to the traditional tenets of partisan warfare. Because the physical expulsion of Soviet forces was beyond its means, the
resistance instead sought to conduct guerilla operations of a scale and intensity that could inflict as high a price as possible on Soviet forces and
could also be sustained indefinitely.106

The Afghan struggle against the Soviet presence acquired a religious dimension. It became a jihad.107
The unremitting violations of human rights and humanitarian law
breached legal obligations to which the Soviet Union was bound by treaty.108
Afghans would live with the resulting human rights and development consequences for years after the Soviet withdrawal. The profound attack on human rights and Afghan culture caused the country to largely disintegrate before being captured by an Islamic fundamentalist movement and becoming
host to al Qaeda, a development that would have transnational effects.
As the population suffered under withering attacks, the mujahidin
achieved battlefield successes with the support of an U.S. covert aid program. In 1988, Kremlin elites concluded that the costs were too high and cut
its losses. Soviet troops withdrew in 1989. The Soviet war was a period of
human dignity under assault that is engrained in the collective Afghan
memory. The period has been very well chronicled.109

106. Marin J. Strmecki, Power Assessment: Measuring Soviet Power in Afghanistan 428
(1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file with author).
107. See HENRY S. BRADSHER, AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET UNION (1985); see also
supra note 4.
108. See JERI LABER & BARNETT RUBIN, A NATION IS DYING (1988); Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, supra note 104.
109. See, e.g., THOMAS BARFIELD, AFGHANISTAN: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY (2010); ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, POWER AND PRINCIPLE (1990); STEVE COLL, GHOST
WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN LADEN, FROM THE
SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001 (2004); EDWARD GIRARDET, AFGHANISTAN:
THE SOVIET WAR (1985); DORIS LESSING, THE WIND BLOWS AWAY OUR WORDS (1987);
NANCY NEWELL & RICHARD NEWELL, THE STRUGGLE FOR AFGHANISTAN (1981); AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: ISLAM, OIL AND THE NEW GREAT GAME IN CENTRAL ASIA (2000);
OLIVIER ROY, ISLAM AND RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN (1985); RUBIN, supra note 89; ABDUL SHAMS, IN COLD BLOOD: THE COMMUNIST CONQUEST OF AFGHANISTAN (1987);
VLADISLAV TAMAROV, AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET VIETNAM (1992).
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In 1988, the President of the Afghan Interim Government, Ahmed Shah,
told this author, “Our hope is that America will not wash its hands of Afghanistan.”110 It was becoming clear to moderate Afghans that Washington
was losing interest and consequently giving little thought to which resistance
organizations were benefiting from the massive inflow of arms. The bulk of
those decisions were left to Pakistani intelligence.111 This view colored the
British disentanglement from Afghanistan years earlier.112
When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, then President Najibullah dug in
until 1992 when the mujahidin took Kabul.113 The city was captured by Tajik
leader Burhanuddin Rabbani and Commander Ahmad Shah Massood with
the support of Uzbek forces led by General Rashid Dostum.114 The Pashtun
parties based in Peshawar and their military organizations were largely absent. For the previous three hundred years, Pashtuns had controlled the capital. Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun fundamentalist who had been well
armed by Pakistan and the United States, pummeled the city. This open ethnic wound would eventually play to the Taliban base.115
The Geneva Accords had paved the way for chaos, which the Taliban
exploited to justify the imposition of a rigid sixteenth-century brand of Islam
previously unknown to most of the Afghan population.116 Girls were sent
home from schools, the university was shut down, and female doctors were
ordered out of the hospital.117 There were cases of women needing medical
treatment being turned away from the hospital and men were ordered to
grow beards. Anything deemed un-Islamic was prohibited and punished.

110. Charles Norchi, United States Walks Away from Afghanistan Vacuum, THE CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 1, 1988.
111. See COLL, supra note 109.
112. GEORGE MACDONALD FRASER, FLASHMAN

146 (1969) (“The alternative now is
a hurried withdrawal, which no one here can guarantee in safety, for none has the power to
restrain the wilder tribes. And Afghanistan will be left to warring factions.”).
113. Ambassador Peter Tomsen, Special Envoy to the Afghan resistance from 1989 to
1992, describes the events in PETER TOMSEN, THE WARS OF AFGHANISTAN MESSIANIC
TERRORISM, TRIBAL CONFLICTS, AND THE FAILURES OF GREAT POWERS (2013).
114. Id.
115. See EDWARD GIRARDET, KILLING THE CRANES (2012).
116. AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN
CENTRAL ASIA 22 (2d ed. 2000).
117. See Charles H. Norchi, Human Rights: The Struggle for Dignity, in AFGHANISTAN:
CROSSLINES ESSENTIAL FIELD GUIDES 53 (Edward Girardet & Jonathan Walter eds., 2d
ed. 2004).
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Taliban leaders were largely uneducated in matters of Islam or government
and religion became a convenient mask for exercising power.118
In an advanced digital and globally connected era, it was difficult to comprehend that expression, education, and decisionmaking across an entire nation could be squelched. The Taliban emerged in the mid- to late-1990s, a
period marked by the Internet, email, and interactive CD ROMs. Yet these
features were partial contours of the times. Taliban Islam, which brokered
no discussion or debate and claimed a level of purity and sacrifice, appealed
to young zealots and the newly radicalized. The Taliban opposed modernism, progress, culture, science, and economic development.119
On September 11, 2001 a coordinated attack, using four hijacked passenger airliners brought down the World Trade Center twin towers in New
York and destroyed a wing of the Pentagon building. A fourth plane on the
way to Washington crashed in Pennsylvania. The death toll of nearly 3,000
people exceeded that of the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor.120
Operation Enduring Freedom removed the Taliban regime and a new
chapter in Afghanistan’s national constitutive process opened with the Bonn
Agreement.121 The Bonn Agreement committed the Transitional Government to an interim legal framework based on the Constitution of 1964 that
operated during the time of the King. The Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan was inaugurated on December 22, 2001.122 The former King Mohammad Zahir Shah returned to Kabul after twenty-nine years of exile in
Rome, and opened an emergency Loya Jirga on June 9, 2002.123 An assembly
of 1,500 Afghans streamed into Kabul to select a government, under the
protection of U.S. and allied troops.124 In December 2003, a subsequent Loya
118. For an account of the U.S. Ambassador and Special Envoy to Afghanistan from
1989 to 1992, see PETER TOMSEN, THE WARS OF AFGHANISTAN (2011).
119. Thomas Gouttierre, Director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska observed, “There is nowhere to go [in Afghanistan] for really credible education and training. . . . It’s such a tragedy, I lived in a country and saw a society that
believed in education.” Amy Magaro Rubin, A Bleak Future for Afghan Higher Education, 44
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Sept. 5, 1997, at A73.
120. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 1 (2004).
121. RUBIN supra 89, at 149; see also WILLIAM MALEY, THE AFGHANISTAN WARS 224
(2009).
122. RUBIN, supra note 82.
123. Id. at 151.
124. Id.; see also Anders Fänge, The Emergency Loya Jirga: Hopes and Disappointments, AFGHANISTAN ANALYSTS NETWORK (2012), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/09/2_Fange_The_Emergency_Loya_Jirga.pdf.
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Jirga was convened to serve as the constitutional convention. A preliminary
draft constitution was completed in the spring of 2003. A marker in a battle
of conflicting demands, it was debated and revised in meetings continuing
through the Constitutional Loya Jirga until approved.
The 2004 Constitution was a laudable text. But would it ever become the
operational code for the conduct of the government? A newly drafted constitution may be a myth while what people actually do in informal settings is
the accepted code of operation. The Constitution again codified the Loya
Jirga, stating, “the Loya Jirga is the highest expression of the will of the people of Afghanistan.”125 Where the National Assembly is termed an expression of the will of the Afghan people, in keeping with tradition, the Loya Jirga
is the highest expression of that will, authoritative and controlling.
A subtext in the debate at the 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga was over
who would own Afghanistan’s Constitution. Well-meaning foreigners offered drafting advice and even model texts. This exposed Afghans who were
working for a draft that reflected international human rights standards to
criticism. Faruq Wardak, director of the Constitutional Commission said,
“Western minded people say mullahs are making the constitution, the fundamentalist elements say the Americans are making our constitution.”126
The process appeared to be “imposed constitutionalism” to borrow a
phrase from Noah Feldman, who writes,
[a]lthough the wholesale imposition of an entire constitutional order is increasingly rare, constitutions are being drafted and adopted in the shadow
of a gun. In the last decade in the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Afghanistan, and . . . Iraq, interim or permanent constitutions have been drafted
under the conditions of de facto or de jure occupation. Each of the cases
has also seen substantial intervention and pressure imposed from outside
to produce constitutional outcomes preferred by international actors . . . .

125. The President convenes the Loya Jirga. It makes decisions relating to “independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and high public interests,” to “modify commandments of the constitution,” and for “other issues stated in this constitution.” Membership of the Loya Jirga consists of “(1) Members of the national assembly, (2) Presidents
of provincial councils, (3) Representatives of the provinces in proportion to the population
on the basis of general, free, secret and direct elections in accord with law.” AFGHANISTAN
CONSTITUTION, supra note 80, art. 110.
126. Interview with Faruq Wardak, Director, Constitutional Commission, in Kabul,
Afghanistan (Aug. 2003).
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Yet there is something theoretically and practically distinctive about imposed liberal constitutionalism today: it takes place against a backdrop of
widespread commitment to democratic self-determination.127

The indigenous commitment may be to a sui generis form of self-determination and to Western style democracy only as a myth.
For the next decade, Afghanistan seemed to be in a state of permanent
reconstruction and became victim to what William Easterly calls the “Cartel
of Good Intentions.”128 During this period, a massive influx of foreign aid
poured into the country, but the international development technocracy
largely dominated these projects while producing local dependency and thus
self-perpetuating their presence within the country.129 Afghanistan was a faux
State, a polity whose real power lay in diffuse pockets disconnected from the
center. A constitution was in place, government ministries buzzed with activity, and the government had a seat in the United Nations. Yet warlords
and their private armies controlled the provinces, engaging in banditry and
“taxed” commerce. Effective control and authority of the government was
confined to a narrow space.
Under President Obama, U.S. troop levels within Afghanistan reached
an apex of 100,000 in 2010.130 In 2011, Osama Bin Laden was found in Pakistan and killed in a special operations raid that Obama authorized.131 Later
that year a steady troop draw down began.132 On August 21, 2017, President
Trump stated the U.S. policy would be an open-ended military commitment
127. Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 857,
858–59 (2005).
128. See William Easterly, The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign
Aid, 5 JOURNAL OF POLICY REFORM 223 (2002).
129. See James Bovard, The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY
ANALYSIS, no. 65, Jan. 31, 1986, at 1, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/continuing-failure-foreign-aid; P. Boone, Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid, 40 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 289 (1996); Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid, Policies and
Growth, 90 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 847 (2000); see generally WILLIAM EASTERLY,
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS’ ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES
IN THE TROPICS (2001).
130. See OUR LATEST LONGEST WAR: LOSING HEARTS AND MINDS IN AFGHANISTAN
(Aaron B. O’Connell ed., 2017) (featuring essays by U.S. veterans on history, governance,
strategy, special operations, and the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan).
131. For a full account of this period, see STEVE COLL, DIRECTORATE S: THE CIA AND
AMERICA’S SECRET WARS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN (2018).
132. A Timeline of U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan Since 2001, MILITARY TIMES (July 6,
2016), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2016/07/06/a-timeline-of-us-troop-levels-in-afghanistan-since-2001/.
383

International Law Studies

2019

to prevent a “vacuum for terrorists.”133 But on December 19, 2018, he ordered a withdrawal of 7,000 troops, half of the remaining 14,000.134 For the
Afghan population, the pendulum swung again from personal insecurity to
the expectation of violence—the familiar pattern of their longue durée.135
IV.

BELOW THE STATE

Since the Peace of Westphalia,136 populations have looked to nation-States
to satisfy a wide range of needs. Operating in a community of similarly organized units, these territorial political arrangements provided security for
citizens who were also bases of State power. In return for security, the people
ceded control and conferred an expectation of authority upon ruling State
elites. This bargain was a foundation of the State system and formed the
delicate balance upon which world order turned. But increasingly, weak and
fragile States have collapsed, piercing their sovereignty. People living within
their borders were often engulfed by armed conflict and their human rights
eclipsed. Failed and wobbly States harbored exportable violence and became
problems for an international system that lacked the institutional capacity to
address such problems.
The U.N. Charter did not contemplate the collapse or disintegration of
a State.137 It presumed effective communication among sovereign governments and their elites, and a range of action available to the Security Council,
including provisional measures, sanctions short of force, and coercion.
These instrumentalities were designed to bring pressure upon a cohesive
133. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Mark Landler, Trump Outlines New Afghanistan War Strategy with Few Details, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
08/21/world/asia/afghanistan-troops-trump.html.
134. Gordon Lubold & Jessica Donati, Trump Order Big Troop Reduction in Afghanistan,
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-is-considering-substantial-afghan-troop-drawdown-11545341452.
135. See AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO CHAOS (2010); SETH G. JONES, IN THE GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES, AMERICA’S WAR IN AFGHANISTAN (2009).
136. The origin of the modern nation-State system can be traced to 1648 and the Thirty
Years War that ended with the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck or the Peace of Westphalia. It has also been argued that that the State system originated with the Concordat of
Worms in 1122 because the Investiture Struggle established a property right corresponding
to sovereign territory—“the right of kings to the income from the territory defined by the
domain of each bishop.” See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Popes, Kings, and Endogenous Institutions: The Concordat of Worms and the Origins of Sovereignty, 2 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW,
no. 2, 2000, at 93.
137. See U.N. Charter, arts. 1, 2.
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form of supranational political organization: functioning States. However,
by the late twentieth century the problem of failing States was becoming an
urgent challenge.138 With the September 11, 2001 attacks, it was apparent
that disintegrating and failed States were “threats to the peace” under the
meaning of Article 39 of the U.N. Charter.139 Since preventing threats to the
peace is a fundamental purpose of the United Nations,140 the world community came to appreciate that addressing this type of threat would require
strengthening fragile States and reconstructing failed States.141
The presumed robust character of the sovereign State increasingly convulsed from the conditions of the twenty-first century. Sovereignty was not
absolute.142 It had been changing to reflect the reality of the world social process, yet sovereignty remained an important technique wielded by State elites,
and it performed a stabilizing international function that was central to maintaining world public order.143 The old bargain had begun to change from the
peoples’ ceding of power to the sovereign in return for security, to the peoples’ ceding of power to the sovereign in return for guarantees of rights. 144
138. See Chester Crocker, Engaging Failing States, 82 FOREIGN AFFAIRS Sept.–Oct. 2003,
at 32.
139. U.N. Charter art. 39.
140. Id. art. 1(1).
141. None of the U.N. institutional machinery effectively helped countries transition
from war to peace. Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed a Peacebuilding Commission
as a key U.N. reform based on the recommendations of the High Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change he had convened. U.N. Secretary-General, Note by the SecretaryGeneral to the General Assembly, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
142. C. Wilfred Jenks’ observation that “Sovereignty is not absolute, but divisible” was
increasingly apparent. He had observed that this was “inconceivable to the dogmatic school
of thought” represented by Hobbes’ Leviathan, “which regarded the essence of sovereignty
as being its absolute quality.” C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 499 (1964).
143. As observed by Judge Alvarez in the Corfu Channel judgment,
Sovereignty confers rights upon States and imposes obligations on them. . . . This notion
has evolved and we must now adopt a conception of it which will be in harmony with the
new conditions of social life. We can no longer accept sovereignty as an absolute and individual right of every State . . . . The sovereignty of States has now become an institution, an
international social function of a psychological character, which has to be exercised in accordance with the new international law.

Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 43 (Apr. 9) (individual opinion
by Alvarez, J.).
144. The old myth was giving way to a view of sovereignty based on an international
legal instrument: “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government.” G. A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 21(3) (Dec. 10,
1948).
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Where absolute sovereignty was about State security, popular sovereignty is
about human dignity.145 And a secure State might enhance the rights and
dignity of the population. But sovereignty, as traditionally conceived, had
helped solve, or at least significantly improve, a problem of the anarchical
State system: maintaining order in international relations.146
For States that were weak and whose territorial integrity was challenged,
sovereignty was severable.147 Francis Fukuyama wrote, “sovereignty and the
nation-state, cornerstones of the Westphalian system, have been eroded in
fact and attacked in principle, because what goes on inside states—in other
words their internal governance—often matters intensely to other members
of the international system.”148 Interventions, both humanitarian and strategic-based, resulted in the removal of odious regimes and nation-building projects that assumed traditional State functions. As one scholar has noted,
“[t]he state-building practices of international administrations reveal a sovereignty paradox: international administrations compromise a fundamental
aspect of a political community’s sovereignty by violating its right to selfgovernance, but do so with the aim of making it sovereign with regard to the
relations between state and society.”149 This describes Afghanistan in the year
2019. Sovereignty is pierced; formal institutions of government are weak; yet
life below the State goes on.
145. In his 1999 annual address to the General Assembly, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan stated,
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces of globalization
and international cooperation. The State is now widely understood to be the servant of its
people, and not vice versa. . . . [I]t is not the deficiencies of the Charter which have brought
us to this juncture, but our difficulties in applying its principles to a new era; an era when
strictly traditional notions of sovereignty can no longer do justice to the aspirations of peoples everywhere to attain their fundamental freedoms.

Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to the
General Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136, GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999).
146. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 53 (1977).
147. The principle of territorial integrity of States is a central goal of the United Nations.
See U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 2(7) (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . .”).
148. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 92 (2004).
149. “By establishing international administrations and denying self-governance to the
affected populations, the international community compromises one of the fundamental
aspects of sovereignty, the norm of self-determination.” DOMINIK ZAUM, THE SOVEREIGNTY PARADOX: THE NORMS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL STATEBUILDING 27
(2007).
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Through tranquility, violence, and chaos many Afghan communities had
thrived.150 They drew on common interests animated by social capital and
shared cultural and religious perspectives. They thrived below the State. As
Thomas Barfield has observed,
One reason that Afghan society has survived so many years of turmoil has
been its ability to govern itself at the local level even in the absence of state
institutions. The international community should take advantage of this
strength by recognizing that most problems are not solved in the formal
judicial institutions but rather informally.151

But how should external actors engage a polity and its people in a context
of conflict and fractured sovereignty? Or, as Michael Reisman asked, “What
are the strategies available to communities in transition, for their process of
redefinition, and what role should the international community—an increasingly effective participant in all these sub-communities—take in the process?”152 If law is an available strategy, how can it be effectively wielded in
Afghanistan and advance the goal values of the body politic?153
V.

LAW AS STRATEGY

Harold Lasswell delivered the March 20, 1952 U.S. Naval War College lecture on strategy.154 His view of strategy accounted for ends, means, and values. For Lasswell, “The management of base values to achieve scope values
is strategy” 155 Values are preferred outcomes—the things people need and
want. And accumulated values (base) could generate additional values

150. See RORY STEWART, THE PLACES IN BETWEEN (2004).
151. Thomas Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan, 60
MAINE LAW REVIEW 2 (2008).
152. Theme II Roundtable Communities in Transition: Autonomy, Self-Governance and Independence, 87 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 248, 249 (1993) (featuring remarks by W. Michael Reisman).
153. Values, for Lasswell and New Haven School of Jurisprudence, as described in
Lasswell’s 1952 U.S. Naval War College lecture were terms that described social process
dynamics: power, wealth, respect, well-being, enlightenment, skill, affection, and rectitude.
See Lasswell supra note 2, at 53.
154. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
155. HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, 1 JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE
SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 345 (1992).
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(scope).156 Law is a strategic instrument because of its value manipulating and
fulfilling qualities, including the value power.157
Michael Reisman explains that law in every community is made by a continuing and comprehensive process of communication.158 This process entails communications directed toward a target audience. Each communication contains policy content, an authority signal, and a control intention indicated by the communicators.159 In order to know the law, one cannot solely
rely on formal agreements and other textual statements.160 One must also
observe habitual behavior. Behavior, which in the beginning might be considered unlawful, if repeated and tolerated throughout a period, might eventually become regarded as lawful. To make the distinction requires appraising
the flow of behavior and the flow of words. Thus, Myres McDougal states,
“[T]he term ‘law’ includes reference to both authority, in the sense of community expectations about the requirements of decision, and control, in the
sense of actual participation in the making and enforcement of decision.”161
Legal systems must not be confused with legal rules. In any community,
rules rest on the surface of the legal system.162 The real dimensions of the
system are often found in other places. One must come to terms with other
processes within the culture and the society if one is to truly understand law
156. Because the number of preferred outcomes is infinite, Lasswell used a workable
heuristic of eight terms: power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect,
rectitude. See HAROLD D. LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES 18 (1971).
157. Law has been appraised as a strategic instrument under the rubric, “Lawfare,”
which Charles Dunlap defines “as the strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute
for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.” Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.,
Lawfare Today, YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Winter 2008, at 146; see also
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today . . . And Tomorrow, 87 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES
315(2011); Dale Stephens, The Age of Lawfare, 87 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 327 (2011).
158. See W. Michael Reisman, International Law-Making: A Process of Communication, 75
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 101 (1981).
159. Id. at 108.
160. Anthropologist Leopold Pospisil identified four attributes of law: authority, intention of universal application, obligatio, and sanction. Obligatio “is the part of the legal decision
which defines the rights of the entitled and the duties of the obligated,” while sanction is
the “authorized power that enforces the applied decision.” See LEOPOLD J. POSPISIL, THE
ETHNOLOGY OF LAW 30 (1985).
161. Myres S. McDougal, Law and Peace, 18 DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POLICY 1, 4 (1989).
162. The “rule of law,” a term heavily used in international development, is about
“norm creation and cultural change as much as an issue of creating new institutions and
legal codes.” See JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE
RIGHT? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 75 (2007).
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in context.163 A legal system may have more to do with custom or religion,
or tradition than with what might be considered modern social conventions.164 Unwritten law, emanating from the political process, is an important
feature of community decisionmaking. This is especially apparent in rural
settings where customary and formalized councils are both engaged in choice
making and resource allocation.165
Anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski urged scholars, “not to study how
human life submits to rules—it simply does not; the real problem is how the
rules become adapted to life.”166 This exercise in what Clifford Geertz called
“thick description,”167 or sorting out the various codes of meaning in webs
of significance, may seem distant from legal method. However, Oliver Wendell Holmes observed:
It is perfectly proper to regard and study the law simply as a great anthropological document. It is proper to resort to it to discover what ideals of
society have been strong enough to reach that final form of expression, or
what have been the changes in dominant ideals from century to century. It
is proper to study law as an exercise in the morphology and transformation
of human ideas.168

Societies and communities possess multiple normative systems. The normative code relied upon by officials may be a myth system whose reliability
for guidance will vary. Far more significant is often the unofficial normative
system that operates as the real operational code.169 As the entrenched normative system of the populace, the operational code will often prevail over
a constitution and codified law. Identifying authority and control enables

163. J.H. Merryman, The Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law,
in NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR A COMMON LAW OF EUROPE 222 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1978).
164. W. Michael Reisman, The Cult of Custom in the Late 20th Century, 17 CALIFORNIA
WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 133 (1978) (“Custom . . . concerns the implicit
creation of norms through the behavior of a few politically relevant actors who are frequently unaware that law is being, or has been, made.”).
165, W. Michael Reisman, Law From The Policy Perspective, in MYRES S. MCDOUGAL &
W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 1, 6 (1981).
166. BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 127 (1948).
167. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973).
168. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARVARD LAW
REVIEW 99 (1889).
169. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES, AND REFORMS 16
(1979).
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distinguishing between real law and lex simulata. Or, as Lasswell and McDougal conclude, “The degree to which the technical legal doctrines of a community represent reality or illusion may in great measure depend upon the
exact interrelations of formal authority and effective control.”170 This conception of law can be strategically deployed in Afghanistan.
The text of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan is one element of a
larger constitutive process whose most enduring dimension is customary decision-making and related practices. Law in Afghanistan has always been a
mix of the weak law of the State in the form of civil codes and courts, and a
more robust customary and Islamic law, the latter two legal frameworks featuring more prominently in the daily lives of most Afghans. Since the founding of the independent Afghan State, successive administrations in Kabul
have sought to impose civil codes upon local communities with centuriesold authoritative decision-making arrangements. Afghan customary law and
practices embody resilient micro-legal systems.171 These environments of enduring normative expectation display the functional equivalents of formal
law and governance. They operate parallel to the Afghan State and allow
ordinary people to survive.
When thinking and operating below the State, it becomes apparent that
“as total systems, societies differ radically in their patterns of values. The
differences reside not only in hierarchies or priorities—the ordering of values according to importance, in some sense—but also in other important
modes of relationships among values.”172 Regardless of the context, there is
an important relationship between values, individual decision making, and
collective community choice. As Talcott Parsons noted,
[t]he values which come to be constitutive of the structure of a societal
system are . . . the conceptions of the desirable type of society held by the
members of the society of reference and applied to the particular society
of which they are members . . . . A value pattern . . . defines a direction of
choice, and consequent commitment to action.173

170. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Trends in Theories about Law: Maintaining
Observational Standpoint and Delimiting the Focus of Inquiry, 8 TOLEDO LAW REVIEW 23 (1976).
171. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999).
172. Robin M. Williams, Jr., Change in Stability in Values and Value Systems: A Sociological
Perspective, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN VALUES 17 (Milton Rokeach ed., 1979).
173. Talcott Parsons, On the Concept of Value-Commitments, 38 SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY
135, 136 (1968).
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A key task is to appraise the direction of choice implicit in value aspirations
in communities and these may be disconnected from the formal State.
In his Naval War College lecture on strategy, Lasswell described “distinctive means” and “distinctive effects.”174 A distinctive mean that generated distinctive effects across Afghanistan was the National Solidarity Program (NSP).175 It is a concrete example of deploying law as strategy beneath
the Afghan State.176 NSP was implemented by the government of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) with
funding from the International Development Association (IDA) of the
World Bank Group. The program’s goal was to facilitate an inclusive participatory process within the community that would result in an equitable community development plan comprising one or more subprojects that would
be eligible for funding under both the NSP and other existing programs. The
longer-term goal was the creation of community institutions that would become the expression of the community’s ability to mobilize, consult, plan,
finance, implement, and evaluate its own development.177 NSP became a national program to accumulate value and develop institutional capacity.178
NSP was designed for a context in which the power of the Afghan central government was limited to Kabul and its immediate environs. Outside
Kabul, the country was controlled by a myriad of major and minor warlords
who carved out small and sometimes quite large fiefdoms in the political
vacuum that emerged after the fall of the Taliban. Because the central government was unable to control or neutralize destabilizing elites, it devised
NSP, in large part, to fill power interstices in the short-run by providing services directly to communities. Service delivery was, however, conditioned
174. Lasswell, supra note 2, at 50.
175. According to the initiative’s Operational Manual, “NSP promotes a new development paradigm whereby communities are empowered to make decisions and control resources during all stages of the project cycle.” See MINISTRY OF RURAL REHABILITATION
AND DEVELOPMENT (AFGHANISTAN), NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM OPERATIONAL
MANUAL 4 (2003) (noting that this refers to the Dec. 1, 2003 draft version) [hereinafter NSP
OPERATIONAL MANUAL]; see also 3RD EYE PHOTOJOURNALISM CENTER, CELEBRATING
TEN YEARS OF THE NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM (NSP): A GLIMPSE OF THE RURAL
DEVELOPMENT STORY IN AFGHANISTAN (2013), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/155731467993744166/pdf/819840WP0FINAL0Box0379855B00PUBLIC0.pdf.
176. Aligning strategy and aid in Afghanistan has long been a challenge. See PETER
MARSDEN, AFGHANISTAN: AID, ARMIES & EMPIRES (2009).
177. See Alastair McKechnie, Rebuilding a Robust Afghan Economy, in BUILDING A NEW
AFGHANISTAN 98 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2007)
178. NSP operated in most Afghan provinces and by 2006 covered nearly 20,000 villages. See NSP OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 175.
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upon fundamental changes in local constitutive processes. Kabul elites saw
the long-term NSP goal as laying the foundations for improving local governance and strengthening democracy by making the process relevant at the
village level, while also fostering local initiative for sustainable development
and extending the power of the central government through contact with
the rural population.179
NSP was about law and governance as much as development. A key factor in achieving program goals was universal suffrage of representative Community Development Councils (CDCs).180 The CDC was established
through an election, conducted by secret ballot, where each person had one
vote. Importantly, men and women were eligible to serve on CDCs. The
CDC members regularly consulted amongst themselves and with the community about development needs and priorities. They would manage and
monitor the use of their development resources. While CDCs could contribute to the empowerment of the poor and to the stability of Afghanistan, they
could also contribute to violence and instability if they attempted to displace
traditional customary practices, particularly if done so abruptly.
The program defined a community as a village of more than 50 families.
A development council was established for each community and a block
grant allocated.181 The MMRD contracted with facilitating partners,182 eventually covering thirty-two provinces. The role of the facilitating partners operating within the NSP framework was to create an enabling environment
179. NSP was built upon four core elements. (1) Facilitation at the community level,
would assist communities to either establish or strengthen their institutions through elections, and achieve consensus on project priorities (2) Block grant transfers planned and
implemented by elected and inclusive community institutions. (3) Capacity building activities designed to enhance transparent community management. (4) Linkage activities to connect local institutions to government line ministries. NSP OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra
note 175, at 4.
180. The Development Council is a community-based decision making body which is
elected by the community through a secret ballot that oversees the preparation of the Community Development Plan and the preparation and implementation of individual sub-projects. Id. at 9.
181. The block grant rate was $200 per family with a limit of $60,000 per community.
Id. at 6.
182. NSP facilitating partners were the Afghan Development Association, ACTED,
ActionAid, AfghanAid, Agha Khan Development Network, Agency for Rehabilitation and
Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA), BRAC, CARE International, Coordination
of Humanitarian Assistance, DACAAR, German Agro Action, GOAL, Ghazi Rural Support, International Rescue Committee, Islamic Relief Agency, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, Sanayee Development Foundation, UN-Habitat.
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through facilitation of inclusive community elections, community planning,
technical assistance, and timely release of funds, so that communities could
plan and manage their development projects. In these traditional Afghan
communities, NSP was crucial to evolving constitutive processes, which was
important, as community empowerment was a key objective of the program.
In the conflict-enveloped communities of Afghanistan, certain decisions
are still made and enforced irrespective of community members’ preferences. These decisions are made through naked power, often by local commanders and warlords. Other decisions—those made by shuras, jirgas, and
CDCs—are from perspectives of authority. These decisions are made by individuals who are expected to act in accordance with the fundamental policies and general expectations of the community. They are achieved through
established procedures and through accepted structures. The individuals
who make these decisions, the shura and CDC members, possess sufficient
influence and community support to put them into operation. These are the
authoritative decisions of the community and therefore law.183
CDCs are similar to shuras and jirgas, albeit with an important distinction.
To the extent practicable, they are gender inclusive. Customary Afghan
governance structures are patriarchal and based on conservative Islamic
values. Securing outcomes in the common interest in Afghanistan and
elsewhere presumes degrees of “normative termination,”184 meaning that as
older norms fall into disuse, communiites begin to accept newer, often more
progessive norms.
The Citizen’s Charter is the successor to NSP.185 It builds on the model
of community decision-making through councils employing familiar legal
values. Under the NSP, customary law arrangements evolved and this trend
can continue under the Citizens’ Charter. However, a much less positive
outcome is also a possibility: a reversion to Taliban norms and prescriptions.

183. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960); see
also Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 170.
184. Harold D. Lasswell & Allan R. Holmberg, Toward a General Theory of Directed Value
Accumulation and Institutional Development, in POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT 354, 378 (Ralph Braibanti ed., 1969) (“Development programs typically entail the
obsolescence and termination of older norms.”).
185. CITIZENS’ CHARTER AFGHANISTAN PROJECT, THE WORLD BANK, https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P160567?lang=en (last visited
Nov. 11, 2019).
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U.S. STRATEGY AND THE WAY OF THE PATHAN186

U.S. engagement in Afghanistan has been a tale of two timeframes—the long
and the short. U.S. foreign policy is often episodic. It is largely conceived to
confront immediate problems and resonates when the objectives are clear,
measurable, and when American might is deployed with a return date. However, certain challenges, such as Afghanistan, are not susceptible to an episodic foreign policy approach. Episodes can be significant building blocks
for a long-term foreign policy when coupled with strategic vision.187 For the
Great Game British, the Cold War Soviets, and the twenty-first century
United States, the overriding challenge in Afghanistan was how to align the
conduct of episodic foreign policy to longue durée problems.
With collapse of the Doha negotiations, a reorientation to the problem
and plausible futures for Afghanistan is in order. Will a post-Doha agreement
bring Afghanistan back to the future by enabling Taliban power?188 Will Afghanistan be a modern State on the outside and an Islamic Emirate on the
inside? Will a severe interpretation of Islamic law be enforced, reversing
women’s rights and curtailing “Western” education? In this scenario, a clash
of values would ensure instability and the probable collapse of the State.
Present trends already indicate a heightened expectation of violence.189

186. The British called Pashtuns “Pathans,” a Hindi word they acquired in India. The
term “Afghan” originally applied only to the Pashtuns. Pashtun customary law is pashtunwali, or the way of the pathans. See JAMES W. SPAIN, THE WAY OF THE PATHANS (1962).
187. See ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, STRATEGIC VISION (2012).
188. Draft documents that emerged from the Doha talks contain conflicting statements
across translations in English, Dari, Pashtu, and Urdu. According to one analyst the draft
Doha Agreement is an “instrument for the enforcement of the Taliban’s shari‘a-based objectives in Afghanistan.” Tufail Ahmad, The Doha Agreement: Paving the Way for the Taliban’s
Takeover of Afghanistan and Enforcement of Shari‘a-Based Governance, MEMRI (July 12, 2019),
https://www.memri.org/reports/doha-agreement-%E2%80%93-paving-way-talibans-take
over-afghanistan-and-enforcement-sharia-based.
189. See, e.g., Susannah George, The Past Three Months in Afghanistan Have Been the Deadliest
for Civilians in a Decade, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ asia_pacific/past-three-months-in-afghanistan-have-been-the-deadliest-for-civilians-in-a-decade/2019/10/17/09bf904e-f054-11e9-bb7e-d2026ee0c199_story
.html. Moreover, as Lasswell noted, “The assumption that men will settle their differences
by fighting reacts powerfully upon the identifications, demands and expectations of human
beings.” HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY 40 (1965).
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But, there is an alternative future. And as General Mark Milley testified,
pulling U.S. troops prematurely from Afghanistan would be a “strategic mistake.”190 The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy stipulated four vital
national interests coupled with strategic pillars all guided by “principled
realism.”191 It declared U.S. vital interests as (1) protecting the homeland, (2)
promoting American prosperity, (3) preserving peace through strength, and
(4) advancing American influence.192 It also acknowledged the central role of
power in international relations, the sovereign State as the sine quo non of
world order, and the principle of promoting American values globally.193
Accordingly, it stated, “The United States will promote a development
model that partners with countries that want progress, consistent with their
culture, based on free market principles, fair and reciprocal trade, private
sector activity, and rule of law.”194 Likewise, it stated, “We will continue to
champion American values and offer encouragement to those struggling for
human dignity in their societies.”195
The National Security Strategy declared a long view commitment,
providing that the United States will “assist fragile states to prevent threats
to the U.S. homeland.” 196 Specific to Afghanistan, it stated:
We are committed to supporting the Afghan government and security
forces in their fight against the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, ISIS, and other terrorists.
190. Lolita C. Baldor & Robert Burns, General: Early Afghanistan Pullout Would Be a Mistake, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 11, 2019, https://www.apnews.com/3b24724c72dd49c2
ba6cab86e7de548c. And as Barnett Rubin pertinently observed,
Despair about Afghanistan may be intellectually respectable, but we cannot walk away from
a civil war in a region with new nuclear powers bordering on the world’s major sources of
energy. And the United States has a special relationship: we paid for many of the weapons
that have destroyed Afghanistan, and we helped put them in the wrong hands.

RUBIN, supra note 89, at 26.
191. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 1 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSSFinal-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf. “A statutorily mandated document, the NSS explains to the
American people, U.S. allies and partners, and federal agencies how the President intends
to put his national security vision into practice on behalf of fellow citizens.” A New National
Security Strategy for a New Era, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/articles/new-national-security-strategy-new-era/.
192. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note
191, at 4.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 38
195. Id.
196. Id. at 39.
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We will bolster the fighting strength of the Afghan security forces to convince the Taliban that they cannot win on the battlefield and to set the
conditions for diplomatic efforts to achieve enduring peace.197

These statements articulate a long-term strategic vision,198 but in
Afghanistan, U.S. strategy has tacked to the episodic.
The United States has enduring interests in Afghanistan—addressing the
threat of exportable terrorism, State collapse, nuclear weapons, regional
chaos, the Kashmir flashpoint,199 the China challenge,200 the influence of
Russia and Iran, the alignment of Chinese and Russian interests, and promoting the dignity and human rights of all Afghans. Indeed, U.S. engagement within Afghanistan is inevitable, yet available resources will be reduced.201 In an environment of resource reduction, law properly conceived
is one available instrument to help achieve these strategic goals.
Strategy entails pursuing ends and means under various contingencies.202
One contingency is the inclusion, and influence, of the Taliban in the Gov-

187.

197. Id. at 50.
198. On the importance of long-term strategic thinking, see BRZEZINSKI, supra note

199. Afghans and Sikhs fought over Kashmir in the 1800s. In the late 1980s Afghan
mujahidin made common cause with Kashmiri guerillas who after 1992 found haven in training camps of eastern Afghanistan. See B.D. HOPKINS, supra note 47, at 75; DAVID LOYN, IN
AFGHANISTAN: TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF BRITISH, RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN OCCUPATION 196 (2010). Pakistan and India, each nuclear armed States, have gone to war over
Kashmir. Further, on August 5, 2019, India terminated the constitutionally protected special
status of Kashmir and deployed troops to the area. See, e.g., India Revokes Disputed Kashmir’s
Special Status with Rush Decree, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2019/08/india-abolishes-kashmir-special-status-rush-decree-190805061331958.html .
200. Afghanistan holds observer status in the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is a vehicle to challenge U.S. influence in Central Asia. China has hosted
Afghan peace conferences, holds mineral rights in Afghanistan’s Mes Aynak copper mine,
and provides equipment and training to the Afghan government. Chinese military vehicles
reportedly operate in the Wakhan corridor. See US Envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad in
China for Peace Meeting, THE NATION (July 11, 2019), https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/us-envoy-to-afghanistan-zalmay-khalilzad-in-china-for-peace-meeting -1.884909.
201. The political and legal environment of the redesigned U.S. mission in Afghanistan
must account for a range of “expectations held by politically relevant actors.” See W. Michael
Reisman, International Legal Dynamics and the Design of Feasible Missions: The Case of Afghanistan,
85 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 59 (2009).
202. See Lasswell, supra note 2, at 63–64; see also LIDDELL HART, STRATEGY (1954), BERNARD BRODIE, STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE (1959); THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY
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ernment of Afghanistan. The internal struggle will be over values. In his lecture, Lasswell emphasized, “the fundamental importance of relating the objectives of any special sphere of strategy to the goal values sought by the
body politic for whom the strategy is formulated.”203 Elsewhere he wrote,
“Strategies are the management of base values to affect value outcomes.”204
An understated, and rarely understood success of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, has been the promotion of values shared by Americans and by
most Afghans. These values will be challenged and potentially curtailed in
post-America Afghanistan. The Taliban will have a seat at the governance
table and the power and influence to shape the direction that the country
takes following a significant U.S. withdraw. “Power is an indispensable component of any effective legal arrangement.”205 This, the Taliban knows.
But, law as strategy can build capacity. The effective performance of
country systems—administration, governance, goods and service delivery, a
suitable regulatory and legal environment for development—depends on capacity. Rather than focus on services, infrastructure, and capital transfers,
donor countries and international organizations must define capacity itself
as the primary objective of all development assistance.206 This requires
devoting attention to the State while operating below. This proposition is
supported by experience in Afghanistan, recent and long past.
A strategy of law for post-America Afghanistan must be conceived (1)
above the State, (2) at the level of the State, and (3) below the State. The
strategic objective is to enable what anthropologist Leopold Pospisil called
“the basic legal function—the exercise of institutionalized social control.” 207
The strategy must explicitly account for the capacity of people and institutions. Capacity is the ability of people, organizations, and society to manage
their affairs successfully.208 Capacity includes problem-solving skills and governance processes and systems that can be sustained. The goal is to build
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“locally-owned processes of improvement in certain organizational spheres
even when conditions in the wider system are suboptimal.”209
Above the State means holding the government of Afghanistan
accountable to its international human rights obligations. At the level of the
State, attention must be devoted to the continued promotion of the
Constitution, secular legal codes, and legal instruction at all Afghan
university law faculties. 210 There have been calls to revise the Constitution
that will intensify with Taliban participation in the government. Hence, the
same attention devoted to drafting the text must be devoted to grounding
the document so the population accepts it as authoritative. A constitution is
more process than text.211 It must be accepted as authoritative by the population, otherwise it is only a myth. People assume a common responsibility
to the extent they participate in assenting to the law. The constitutive process
must take root in the teahouses and mosques.212 The alternative could be the
fate of Amanullah, who was driven from Kabul when his secular legal codes
and reforms were rejected.
Another contingency is the severing of Afghan sovereignty.213 This is
why life as it unfolds below the State will merit very close attention.
Community decision-making outcomes will continue to convey authority
and generate legitimate control. The Taliban will intensely promote their law
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and mobile courts which some communities will accept as authoritaive.214
But even the most traditional community is complex and operates with multiple and dynamic value systems. Thus, the ability to appraise unwritten law,
or custom, will be an indispensable strategic task.215
The effective deployment of law requires continually clarifying goals,
constantly appraising trends, identifying and isolating the factors shaping
those trends, and making realistic projections while considering achievable
alternatives owing to strategic choices.216 To deploy law as strategy in
Afghanistan requires recognizing context, conceiving of law beyond rules,
understanding values,217 building upon authentic operational codes, and
aligning means (available assets) and ends. The NSP and Citizen’s Charter
are good models. International development agencies, civil society, legal
organizations and universities can be good partners. In modern States and
traditional cultures, “[l]aw is a process of human beings making choices.”218
That process has been the way of the Pathan across a longue durée. In the
looming environment of reduced resources, law is a deployable strategy, for
Afghanistan, the United States, and the greater common interest.
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